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MONITORING A GAME OF WINKS, NODS, AND RISK:
DERIVATIVES REGULATION IN THE E.U. AND POLAND
Robert F. Schwartz*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
European Union regulators hailed legislative completion of the
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in mid-2004.1 Announced in
1999, the FSAP covered forty-two measures designed to harmonize
member states’ approach to financial services and the capital
markets.2 Spurred by the introduction of the euro, the FSAP
ultimately aimed to fashion a single financial market with low costs
of capital, high returns on investment, and abundant sources of
funding.3 Number one on the FSAP list of priorities for the
formation of such a market was the formulation of common rules
for integrated securities and derivatives markets.4
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of International Law; Brigham Young University International Law & Management
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Young University (2002). The author thanks the following individuals for their
outstanding insight and patience: Paul G. Mahoney, Brokaw Professor of Corporate
Law, University of Virginia; Christof Fritzen, Managing Director, Deutsche Bank AG;
Mike Becker, Associate, Allen & Overy; and Amy Schwartz. All views are the
author’s own and all translations from Polish are by the author.
1
See Eur. Comm’n, Internal Mkt., Fin. Serv. Pol’y Group, Tenth Progress
Report: Turning the Corner, Preparing the Challenge of the Next Phase of European
Capital Market Integration (June 2, 2004) [hereinafter Tenth Progress Report],
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index
/progress10_en.pdf; compare with Eur. Comm’n, Internal Mkt., Fin. Serv. Pol’y
Group, Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan (May 11,
1999) [hereinafter FSAP], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/
finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf (outlining the Commission’s plan for a
single financial market).
2
See FSAP, supra note 1.
3
See id.; see also Niamh Moloney, Time to Take Stock on the Markets: The
Financial Services Action Plan Concludes as the Company Law Action Plan Rolls
Out, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 999 (2004).
4
See FSAP, supra note 1, at 5.
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The high priority of derivatives regulation under the FSAP was
not new; initial E.U. efforts to deal with derivatives date to the
early 1990s.5 In 1995, faced with the spectacle of the Barings
collapse,6 the European Parliament issued a resolution that
recognized derivatives’ crucial role in global markets. The
European Parliament also stressed the need to address through
legislation challenges generated by explosive growth in derivatives
use.7 The Resolution requested that the European Commission
create an agenda to update the Union’s approach to derivatives and
keep Parliament appraised of all developments.8 As part of its
ongoing effort to fulfill the Resolution’s assignment, the
Commission drafted the FSAP.
Progress under the FSAP has been remarkable. By June 2004,
lawmakers enacted thirty-nine of forty-two measures, including all
derivatives-related measures. Although legislative efforts to
complete the FSAP officially lasted through 2005, regulators in
Europe turned their attention to FSAP implementation as early as
2004.9 Full implementation of derivatives-oriented provisions

5

See, e.g., Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992, On the Coordination
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Insurance
Other than Life Assurance and Amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC,
art. 21(1)(C)(iv), 1992 O.J. (L 228) 1; Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 Mar. 1993,
The Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions, arts. 2(10), 4(1)(i),
4(5), 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27.
6
With regard to the breakdown of Barings, Rasiah Gengatharen notes:
On 27 February 1995 the British merchant bank, Barings Plc,
was placed under administration due to massive losses incurred by
its subsidiary, Barings Futures Singapore (BFS). These losses
stemmed from the unauthorized trading activities of Nick Leeson,
the General Manager of BFS, on the Singapore and Osaka Futures
Exchange.…Leeson was…able to take advantage of the lack of
internal controls and supervision to conceal his losses from
unauthorized trading.
RASIAH GENGATHAREN, DERIVATIVES LAW AND REGULATION 30–31 (1st ed.
2001).
7
Resolution on Parliament’s Recommendations to the Commission Concerning
a Legislative Proposal on Financial Derivatives: Their Present Role on Capital
Markets, Their Advantages and Risks, 1995 O.J. (C 269) 217, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:51995IP0207:
EN:HTML.
8
Id. at 219.
9
See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Financial Services Action Plan: Good
Progress but Real Impact Depends on Good Implementation (June 1, 2004), available
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entails promoting unified standards for accounting, clearing and
settlement, capital sufficiency, risk management, and market
manipulation. As E.U. derivatives regulation shifts from drafting to
implementation, questions arise regarding the new E.U. member
states. How does the “new E.U. ten” measure up to current E.U.
derivatives standards? In particular, how do the heavyweights—
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—measure up?10
When the E.U. Parliament passed its 1995 derivatives
resolution, the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian markets lacked any
notable derivatives trading, exchange oriented or otherwise.11 As
the Commission released the FSAP in 1999, Hungary’s futures
exchange was barely three years old; Poland’s futures market had
existed for one year; and a Czech equivalent was still two years
away from organization.12 Although derivatives markets were up
at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/696&format=HT
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
10
See, e.g., Int’l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Sept.
2004, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/data/. IMF figures show that
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary dwarf their fellow E.U. entrants in terms of
total GDP:
NEW E.U. TEN
POLAND
CZECH REPUBLIC
HUNGARY
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
LITHUANIA
CYPRUS
LATVIA
ESTONIA
MALTA

2001
186
61
52
21
20
12
9
8
6
4

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, CURRENT PRICES
(IN BILLIONS, USD)
2002
2003
2004
191
209
230
74
90
103
65
83
98
24
33
40
22
28
33
14
18
22
10
13
15
9
11
13
7
9
11
4
4
5

11

See, e.g., Bank for Int’l Settlements, Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign
Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2004, at 19 (March 2005) [hereinafter
BIS Derivatives Survey 2004], available at http://www.bis.org/ publ/rpfx05t.pdf; Bank
for Int’l Settlements, Monetary and Econ. Dep’t, Triennial Central Bank Survey:
Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 1998, at 19 (May 1999)
[hereinafter BIS Derivatives Survey 1998], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
r_fx98finaltxt.pdf.
12
See, e.g., Press Release, Prague Stock Exch., On 2nd August 2001, the Prague
Stock Exchange, a. s., Obtained Permission to Organise Derivatives Trading (Mar. 8,
2001), http://www.pse.cz/burza/default.asp?ka=323; Ewa Krawczyk, Rynek
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and running, Czech and Hungarian over-the-counter (OTC, i.e.,
non-exchange-traded) derivatives trading dipped precipitously in
the period from 1998 to 2001 (see Fig. 1).13 More fundamentally,
the capital markets of all three nations were notoriously illiquid. 14
AVERAGE DAILY TURNOVER OF REPORTED OTC DERIVATIVES
7

Market Activity (in billions of US dollars)
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Fig. 1 (created by the author based on of BIS figures)

Despite such shaky first steps, the financial scene in Central
and Eastern Europe has undergone rapid transformation, especially
in Poland. Although recent press and scholarship suggest that the
capital markets of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary show

kontraktów terminowych czyli gra na przyszłość [The Market for Forward Contracts,
or a Bet on the Future], BANKIER.PL, June 25, 2004, available at
http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosci/print.html?article_id=1166384; Budapest Stock
Exchange, http://www.bse.hu/onlinesz/index_e.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
13
BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at 19; BIS Derivatives Survey
1998, supra note 11, at 19.
14
See, e.g., Zbigniew Kominek, Stock Markets and Industry Growth: an Eastern
European Perspective, 36 APPLIED ECON. 1025, at 1026–27 (2004); ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 2004:
POLAND 146 (June 2004) [hereinafter OECD POLAND SURVEY]; Ryszard
Kokoszczyński & Andrzej Sławiński, Poland’s Vulnerability to Turbulence in the
Financial Markets, BIS POL’Y PAPERS (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/plcy08h.pdf.
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signs of increased liquidity,15 derivatives-related developments in
Poland merit special attention for two reasons.
First, Poland has experienced a steady increase in OTC
derivatives trading. While Czech and Hungarian OTC derivatives
trading dipped from 1998 to 2001, OTC derivatives trading has
consistently risen in Poland since 1995 (see Fig. 1).16 In 2004,
Poland’s average daily turnover in reported OTC derivatives stood
at $6 billion; $2 billion more than the Czech Republic and Hungary
combined.
Second, the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) is the largest in
Eastern Europe.17 In the first quarter of 2005, the WSE posted the
third highest number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Europe
after the London and Copenhagen exchanges.18 As one investment
banker recently commented, “The Polish equity market is
attractive…because it has depth and maturity with a number of
liquid stocks, good daily turnover and a well developed derivatives
market.”19
As a key economic player among newly minted E.U. members,
Poland demands a closer look. The region’s quickly growing
derivatives markets and increasingly liquid capital markets require
analysis of E.U. derivatives regulation. In addition, an assessment
15
See, e.g., Kominek, supra note 14, at 1028–29; Kester Eddy, Young Gun,
Attila Szalay-Berzevicky: The New Face of the Budapest Stock Exchange, BUS. HUNG.,
Sept. 2004, available at http://www.businesshungary.com/september/trends01.html.
16
BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at 19; BIS Derivatives Survey
1998, supra note 11, at 19.
17
OECD POLAND SURVEY, supra note 14, at 146, 185. The OECD notes that
2003 WSE market capitalization almost equaled the combined value of the next three
largest exchanges: Budapest, Prague, and Ljubljana. Id. In 2002, the WSE became the
first exchange in Central and Eastern Europe to enter a cross-membership and crossaccess agreement with the Euronext Stock Exchange (a merger of the Paris,
Amsterdam, and Brussels exchanges). See id.; Péter Oszlay, Marriage Plans:
Budapest Stock Exchange Seeks Partners, BUS. HUNG., Mar. 2002, available at
http://www.amcham.hu/BusinessHungary/16-03/articles/16-03_26.asp. The Euronext
link will help the WSE trim transaction costs for Western European traders who wish
to tap the Polish market and help international firms with Eastern European operations
to issue shares. OECD POLAND SURVEY, supra note 14, at 146.
18
See Warsaw Stock Exchange Enjoys Third Largest Number of Debuts in
Europe in Q1 2005, POLAND BUS. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2005.
19
Press Release, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, DrKW Broadens Its Equities
Platform to Offer Trading for Institutional Investor Clients in Polish Blue-chip Stocks
and Derivatives (Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://www.drkw.com/eng/press/
Archive_2005_2753.php; see also Polish Market Proves a Draw, INT’L SEC. FIN., Mar.
2005, available at http://www.isfmagazine.com/default.asp?page=7&PubID=41&ISS
=13004&SID=482111&ReturnPage=5.
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of Poland’s performance in this pan-European regulatory
framework should be reviewed. The key question is how well
Poland has managed to implement FSAP-initiated measures for
derivatives regulation.
B. Overview
The present article proposes to answer this question by
providing an on-the-ground account of current developments in the
Polish derivatives markets. In particular, this article will examine
three vital areas of derivatives in the Polish market: market
manipulation, close-out netting, and accounting standards. This
article will pose practical questions in light of the legal framework
of the E.U. derivatives regime.
Part II will briefly discuss the various types of derivatives and
provides useful background for those unfamiliar with derivatives.
Those who are familiar with derivatives, the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), and their function in the
financial markets should proceed directly to Part III.
Part III will give a concise overview of the historical and
continuing development of European derivatives regulation. This
Part will establish a basis for categorizing and comprehending such
regulation.
Part IV will assess the efforts of Polish regulators to implement
E.U. anti-manipulation, netting, and accounting norms in the
context of derivatives. In addressing legal risk, this article argues
that Polish legislators must update their bankruptcy statute to make
it more equitable in close-out situations. Regarding market
manipulation, this work contends that Polish regulators have not
gone far enough in their efforts to combat manipulation on the
Warsaw exchange. Polish prosecutors must enforce recently
enacted, E.U.-influenced Polish laws prohibiting manipulation.
Further, in the realm of derivatives accounting, Polish and E.U.
regulators must limit the ability of publicly traded companies to
hide financial risk by failing to reflect derivatives at fair market
value on their balance sheets.
Part V will set forth conclusions.
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II. WHAT ARE DERIVATIVES?

A. Fundamental Forms of Derivative Contract
1. Derivatives in general
As its name implies, a derivatives contract draws its value from
some underlying asset (the “underlying”). The underlying can be
physical (a commodity such as corn, steel, or oil) or financial
(equity and debt securities, stock indexes, interest rates, currencies,
or other derivatives). While simply describing derivatives poses
little problem, defining them legally can be much more challenging.
The regulator’s challenge is to avoid both over-inclusion and
under-inclusion in the face of “an endless array of new products
regularly introduced into the marketplace, many of which possess
characteristics that do not easily fit into any established category of
financial instruments.”20 Nonetheless, even the most complex
derivatives contract possesses one or both of two primary elements:
a forward element and an option element.21
2. Forwards
A forward contract is an agreement that “obligates one
counterparty to buy, and the other counterparty to sell, a specific
underlying at a specific price, amount, and date in the future.”22 To
use a physical example, Gillette might need a large amount of
ethanol for use in its aftershave products. Since ethanol comes
chiefly from corn, the price of ethanol varies with crop yields and
other variables. Gillette wants a price that will preserve a favorable
rate of return on its product; the ethanol producer wants the same
thing.
To reduce risk, the two parties could enter into a contract that
would allow both to fix the ethanol price in advance. Gillette, the
buyer in this case, is taking a “long” position and the seller takes a
“short” position. By selling forward, the ethanol producer places on

20

GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 7.
See, e.g., id.
22
Id. at 13 (citing GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES:
PRACTICES AND PRINCIPALS 30 (Group of Thirty 1993)); see also Kimberly D.
Krawiec, More Than Just a “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Approach to
Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, at 9 (1997).
21
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Gillette the risk that ethanol prices might go down. Through its
long position, Gillette is able to shift the risk that ethanol prices
might go up. The name for this mutual risk exchange is hedging;
the symmetry of risk stands at the heart of forward agreements and
distinguishes them from options.23
3. Options
An option is the right to buy or sell a specific underlying asset
at a specified price (strike price) on or before a specific future
date.24 A right to purchase the underlying—e.g., common stock—is
a “call option” while a right to sell the underlying is a “put option.”
If the price of the underlying moves favorably—above the strike
price for a call and below the strike price for a put—the option
holder can exercise the option and enjoy profits. If the price of the
underlying moves unfavorably, the holder can choose not to
exercise the option and has forfeited only the premium paid for the
option. In other words, the option holder has a right but not the
obligation to exercise the option.25
The same does not hold true for the party who writes the
option. The option writer possesses a legal obligation to buy—
when the holder exercises her put—or sell—when the buyer
exercises her call—the underlying. This fact stresses the
asymmetrical risk of options. Whereas forward-based derivatives
give rise to a symmetrical obligation in which the seller’s loss
equals the buyer’s gain or vice versa, an option holder only ever
forfeits the price of the option premium while the option writer’s
loss is potentially unlimited.26 Like forwards, options serve for
hedging or speculation.27
B. Exchange-traded Derivatives
Public exchanges provide forums of exchange for both forwardand option-based derivatives. Like any such trade, the benefit of

23
24
25

See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 13; Krawiec, supra note 22, at 10.
See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 17; Krawiec, supra note 22, at 11.
See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 17–18; Krawiec, supra note 22, at

11–12.
26

Krawiec, supra note 22, at 11–12.
For a detailed explanation of how options can be used to hedge, see Krawiec,
supra note 22, at 12; see, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MEYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 562 (McGraw-Hill 2003) (1981).
27
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exchange-traded derivatives results from the efficiencies of a
standardized contract. Parties do not need to dicker specially
tailored terms regarding method of payment, time and place of
delivery, the quality of the underlying, and so forth—price and
quantity are the only subjects of negotiation. A future is a forwardbased derivative that is exchange-traded and fully standardized in
this manner. Standardization makes futures highly liquid.28 High
liquidity also characterizes exchange-traded options.
Futures exchanges possess peculiar mechanics. When a party
either buys or sells a futures contract, the future price fixes
immediately with payments made only after the contract reaches
maturity. As a result, exchanges require parties to a futures contract
to put up some collateral or “margin” in either the form of cash or
some other highly liquid asset. Putting up collateral or “margin”
demonstrates that parties have money to execute their side of the
bargain. Another exchange peculiarity is “marking-to-market.” To
mark their contract to market, each party calculates and accounts
for any profits or losses on the contract.
Both of these mechanical aspects—margin and marking-tomarket—require an exchange-designated clearinghouse to handle
all of the back and forth between parties. The exchange’s
clearinghouse requires payment for any losses and the exchange
pays out any profits on a given contract. At the end of a trade, the
parties perform a “clearance,” which is a basic recognition and
calculation of all obligations under the trade. “Settlement” is the
physical act of paying and receiving final payment under a mutual
obligation. The European Commission’s Giovannini Report
explained the mechanics thus:
The execution of derivatives trades typically takes
place via direct members of exchanges, and the
clearinghouse acts as central counterparty for all
such trades. While clearing and settlement are
simply post-execution stages in a securities
transaction, clearing is the core process for the
creation of an exchange-traded derivative. As the
clearing process is integral to the very existence of
a market for exchange-traded derivatives, the
[central counterparty] plays a role that is analogous
to a [central securities depository] in a securities
28

See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 22, at 10.
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market. The market structures for exchange-traded
derivatives have evolved very differently from
those for the fixed income and equity markets.29
C. Over-the-counter (OTC) Derivatives
1. Introduction: ISDA and the OTC markets
As of April 2004, the estimated daily global turnover in OTC
derivatives totaled US$3.5 trillion; the notional amounts—“sum of
the nominal absolute value of all deals concluded and still open at
the reference date”—stood at US$221 trillion in June 2004.30 About
seventy-five percent of the outstanding notional amount seeks to
control—or exploit—risks related to interest rates, and almost the
entire balance centers on managing foreign-exchange exposure.31 In
a poll of 386 major corporations across sixteen countries, seventythree percent of respondents reported using derivatives to manage
interest rate exposure and ninety-six percent used currency
derivatives.32
Most organizations that deal in privately negotiated, OTC
derivatives belong to the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA), which currently numbers over 500 member
institutions in over thirty countries.33 Chartered in 1985, ISDA

29
Eur. Comm’n Directorate Gen. for Econ. and Fin. Aff., Economic Papers: The
Giovannini Group, Cross-border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the
European Union, November 2001, 163, 21 (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter Giovannini
Report], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/
economic_papers/2002/ecp163en.pdf.
30
BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at 4, 15.
31
See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 23.
32
Id. at 20.
33
See About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/wwa/wwa_nav.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2006); cf. Sean M. Flanagan, Student Article, The Rise of a Trade Association:
Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 228 (2001). Flanagan relates:

As of January 2001, ISDA has over 500 member
organizations; more than 200 of these are Primary Members, about
160 are Associate Members, and over 130 are Subscribers. The
Primary Membership is composed of dealers and encompasses
banks, securities companies, and large corporations from over
thirty countries, including institutions such as Barclays; Chase
Manhattan Bank; Credit Suisse First Boston International;
Deutsche Bank AG; Enron Corporation; Sumitomo Bank Capital
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emerged as an organization whose mission was to create and
promote standardized documentation for derivatives at a time when
even simple derivatives transactions had high transaction costs.34
The first widely used ISDA documentation was the 1987 Master
Agreement. The 1992 Master Agreement and the 2002 Master
Agreement followed.35 The Master Agreements set forth
standardized, market-driven terms regulating general obligations of
the parties, events of default, netting, early termination, transfer,
currency provisions, and definitions.36 If parties desire to modify
any default provisions in the Master Agreement for their
transaction, they may do so in an amending document called a
“Schedule.”37 The Master Agreement and Schedule, in turn, are
given effect in “confirmations,” which are documents that serve as
evidence of individual transactions under a Master Agreement,
setting forth material terms such as interest rates/currency
conversion rates, time to maturity of the transaction, and so forth.38
One of the key benefits of using the ISDA Master Agreement is
that once in place between two parties, all transactions entered into
under the agreement constitute a single agreement.39 Highlighting
the practical benefit of a “single agreement” structure, Sean
Flanagan explains:
Markets, Inc.; and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. The Associate
Membership includes diverse professional firms and corporations
such as Allen & Overy; the Chicago Mercantile Exchange;
Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Euroclear; KPMG Peat Marwick,
L.L.P.; Standard & Poor's; and QT Software AG. Subscribers
include end-users of derivatives such as the African Development
Bank; British Petroleum Company, P.L.C.; Ford Motor Credit
Company; IBM Corporation; McDonald's Corporation; the
Kingdom of Belgium; and Soros Fund Management, L.L.C.
Id.
34

See About ISDA, supra note 33; cf. Flanagan, supra note 33, at 227–38.
See ISDA Opinions and Documentation, http://www.isda.org/docproj/ncdproj.
html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
36
See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT]; INT’L SWAP DEALERS ASS’N, ISDA
MASTER AGREEMENT (1992).
37
See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA SCHEDULE TO THE 2002
MASTER AGREEMENT (2002); INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA SCHEDULE TO
THE MASTER AGREEMENT (1992).
38
See Flanagan, supra note 33, at 230.
39
2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 1 (“All Transactions are entered
into in reliance on the fact that this Master Agreement and all Confirmations form a
single agreement between the parties…and the parties would not otherwise enter into
any Transactions.”).
35
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An end-user corporation and a swap dealer may
exchange large numbers of confirmations over the
course of several years, resulting in hundreds of
simultaneous swaps between the parties. Without a
master agreement, these swaps would require that
the two parties exchange hundreds of payments at
each swap payment date. The terms of the ISDA
Master Agreement, however, can provide for
netting the payments among all transactions made
under the agreement between the parties (called
“cross-transaction payment netting”). This reduces
transaction costs since numerous swap payments are
incorporated into a single payment.40
Adding to the payment netting regime, the ISDA Master Agreement
also provides for “close-out netting” that applies when one party to
a transaction defaults or declares bankruptcy.41 Close-out netting
allows the non-defaulting party to “calculate a single settlement
amount by offsetting its scheduled future payment and delivery
obligations to the bankrupt party against the bankrupt party’s
obligations to it.”42 The practical benefit of a close-out netting
arrangement is that it precludes a trustee or liquidator in bankruptcy
from “cherry picking”—i.e., repudiating all trades that are out of
the money for the bankrupt estate while insisting on performance of
all trades that accrue to the estate’s benefit.43
Among the ever-expanding universe of derivatives governed by
the ISDA Master Agreement, plain vanilla swaps and forward rate
agreements remain the most used derivatives.44
2. Swaps and forward rate agreements
A swap is basically a series of forward transactions.45 The need
for a swap arises, for instance, when a company has incurred debt
that carries a fixed interest rate and the debtor would prefer a
floating rate. If a company with a fixed-rate liability can find a
40

Flanagan, supra note 33, at 230–31.
See 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 11–15.
42
Flanagan, supra note 33, at 231.
43
S. Rory Derham, Set-off and Netting of Foreign Exchange Contracts in the
Liquidation of a Counterparty: Part 2, Netting, 1991 J. BUS. L. 536, 537 (Nov. 1991).
44
BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at Annex II.
45
Krawiec, supra note 22, at 10.
41
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counterparty with floating-rate liabilities who wishes for the
opposite, the parties can exchange interest payments during a
negotiated contractual term. Practitioners refer to such transactions
as fixed-for-floating interest-rate swaps, or simply “plain vanilla
swaps.”46 Alternatively, much of a company’s cash flow might be
in the form of pesos but the company would prefer dollars. In such
cases, the companies can enter into an analogous currency swap.
Less used but also important are commodity and equity swaps. In
most swap transactions—except for currency swaps—custom
dictates that the parties do not exchange the notional principal,
instead netting all interim payments.47
A forward-rate agreement (FRA) arises in contexts where one
party knows that at the end of period X it will need to incur shortterm debt but worries that interest rates will rise in the interim. The
FRA allows such parties to lock in the interest rates with a bank.
Applying the same netting that applies in swaps, if interest rates are
higher than the negotiated percentage rate at the end of period X,
then the bank pays the difference. Likewise, if the interest rate is
lower, the party owes the bank any difference.
III. E.U. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES REGULATION
A. A General Framework of E.U. Derivatives Provisions

DERIVATIVES-RELATED E.U. STATUTES
CATEGORY
STATUTE
YEAR
Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June
1992
1992, Relating to Direct Insurance Other
than Life Assurance, 1992 O.J. (L 228) 1
Parliament and Council Directive
2000
RISK
2000/12/EC of 20 March 2000, Relating
MANAGEMENT to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the
Business of Credit Institutions, Annex III,
2000 O.J. (L 126) 1, 52
Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May
2000
2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, 2000
O.J. (L 160) 1, arts. 4, 6 (EC)

46
47

See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 16–17.
See, e.g., id.
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RISK
MANAGEMENT
(CONT.)

SETTLEMENT
AND

CLEARANCE

ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS
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STATUTE
Parliament and Council Directive
2001/108/EC of 21 Jan. 2002, Amending
Council Directive 85/611 Relating to
Undertakings for Collective Investment in
Transferable Securities (UCITS), 2002
O.J. (L 41) 35
Parliament and Council Directive
2002/83/EC of 5 Nov. 2002, Concerning
Life Assurance, 2002 O.J. (L 345) 1
Parliament and Council Directive
2004/39/EC of 21 Apr. 2004, On Markets
in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J. (L
145) 1
Parliament and Council Directive
98/26/EC of 19 May 1998, On Settlement
Finality in Payment and Securities
Settlement Systems, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 45
Parliament and Council Directive
2000/12/EC of 20 Mar. 2000, Relating to
the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business
of Credit Institutions, Annex III, 2000
O.J. (L 126) 1, 52
Parliament and Council Directive
2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002, On Financial
Collateral Arrangements, 2002 O.J. (L
168) 43
Council Regulation 2223/96 of 25 June
1996, On the European System of
National and Regional Accounts in the
Community, 1996 O.J. (L 310) 1 (EC)
Commission Recommendation
2000/408/EC of 23 June 2000,
Concerning Disclosure of Information on
Financial Instruments and Other Items
Complementing the Disclosure Required
According to Council Directive
86/635/EEC on the Annual Accounts and
Consolidated Accounts of Banks and
Other Financial Institutions, 2000 O.J.
(L 154) 36

YEAR
2002

2002
2004

1998

2000

2002

1996

2000
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CATEGORY

YEAR

STATUTE
Parliament and Council Regulation
2558/2001/EC of 3 Dec. 2001, Amending
Council Regulation 2223/96 as Regards
the Reclassification of Settlements Under
Swaps Arrangements and Under Forward
ACCOUNTING Rate Agreements 2001 O.J. (L 344) 1
STANDARDS
Parliament and Council Regulation
(CONT.)
1606/2002 of 19 July 2002, On the
Application of International Accounting
Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1
Commission Regulation 707/2004 of 6
Apr. 2004, Amending Regulation
1725/2003 Adopting Certain International
Accounting Standards in Accordance with
Regulation 1606/2002 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2004 O.J.
(L 111) 13 (EC)
Parliament and Council Directive
MARKET
2003/6/EC of 28 Jan. 2003, On Insider
MANIPULATION Dealing and Market Manipulation
(Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16

2001

2002

2004

2003

Perhaps owing to the history and nature of exchange-traded
derivatives, E.U. regulators have never seen fit to define them,
leaving the task to individual exchanges. The first E.U. effort to
grapple with a legislative definition of OTC derivatives came in
1993. In its Directive 93/6 of 15 March 1993, the Council provided:
[O]ver-the-counter (OTC) derivative instruments
shall mean the interest-rate and foreign-exchange
contracts referred to in Annex II to Directive
89/EC/EEC [amended by Annex III to Directive
2000/12/EC] and off-balance-sheet contracts based
on equities, provided that no such contracts are
traded on recognized exchanges where they are
subject to daily margin requirements and, in the
case of foreign-exchange contracts, that every such
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contract has an original maturity of more than 14
calendar days.48
Annex III to Directive 2001/12 enumerates a long list of derivatives
contracts, including single-currency interest-rate swaps, basisswaps, forward-rate agreements, interest-rate futures, interest-rate
options, and many variations on such contracts.49 Although such a
definition appears prescriptive, the Council in fact left the field of
possible derivative contracts wide open, recognizing all “other
contracts of a similar nature.”50
Upon initial consideration, the development of E.U. derivatives
norms seems both disparate and diffuse—spread out over more than
a decade. One first recognizes that twice as many derivativesrelated provisions appeared in the five years following
announcement of the FSAP as did in the seven years preceding.
Indeed, the categories and guidelines contained in the FSAP allow
one to sort E.U. derivatives legislation into four broad categories:
risk management, clearance and settlement, accounting, and market
manipulation.51

48

Council Directive 93/6/EEC, supra note 5, art. 2(10), at 1, 4.
Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC of 20 March 2000, Relating to
the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, Annex III, 2000 O.J.
(L 126) 1, 52.
50
Id.
51
The key risk-management provisions include: Council Directive 92/49/EEC,
supra note 5; Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC of 21 Jan. 2002, supra
note 49; Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000, On Insolvency Proceedings,
2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC); Parliament and Council Directive 2001/108/EC of 21 Jan.
2002, Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities,
2002 O.J. (L 41) 35; Parliament and Council Directive 2002/83/EC of 5 Nov. 2002,
Concerning Life Assurance, 2002 O.J. (L 345) 1; Parliament and Council Directive
2004/39/EC of 21 Apr. 2004, On Markets in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J.
(L 145) 1.
For provisions relating to settlement and clearance: Parliament and Council
Directive 98/26/EC of 19 May 1998, On Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities
Settlement Systems, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 45; Parliament and Council Directive
2000/12/EC, supra note 49; Parliament and Council Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June
2002, On Financial Collateral Arrangements, 2002 O.J. (L 168) 43.
To see E.U. provisions on accounting standards, consult: Council Regulation
2223/96 of 25 June 1996, On the European System of National and Regional Accounts
in the Community, 1996 O.J. (L 310) 1 (EC); Commission Recommendation
2000/408/EC of 23 June 2000, Concerning Disclosure of Information on Financial
Instruments and Other Items Complementing the Disclosure Required According to
Council Directive 86/635/EEC on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of
Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 2000 O.J. (L 154) 36; Parliament and Council
49
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Prerequisite to grasping the E.U. regime of derivatives
provisions, one must appreciate the practical difference between
directives and regulations. Regulations are binding statutory
measures—binding as to both ends and means—directly applicable
to all member states.52 “The phrase ‘directly applicable’...signifies
that regulations are taken to be part of the national legal systems
automatically, without the need for separate national legal
measures.”53 In the wake of a regulation, an E.U. member state
might need to modify its law to effect compliance.
Directives, in distinction, are binding only with regard to their
end purpose. Directives give member states legislative leeway in
choosing the form and method of implementation. Another key
difference between directives and regulations is that directives must
be “notified to the person to whom they are addressed.”54
“Directives are particularly useful when the aim is to harmonize the
laws within a certain area or to introduce complex legislative
change.”55 Thus, given the “complex changes” occasioned by
efforts to harmonize member states’ derivatives regulations, it is
little surprise that most E.U. derivatives provisions are directives.
This is true of risk management harmonization.
B. Risk Management
1. Market, counterparty, and other risks
The seminal initiatives that require companies and central
banks to manage derivatives-related risk come from the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision.56 The Basle Committee
Regulation 2558/2001/EC of 3 Dec. 2001, Regarding the Reclassification of
Settlements Under Swaps Arrangements and Under Forward Rate Agreements 2001
O.J. (L 344) 1; Parliament and Council Regulation 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002, On the
Application of International Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC);
Commission Regulation 707/2004 of 6 Apr. 2004, Amending Regulation 1725/2003
Adopting Certain International Accounting Standards in Accordance with Regulation
1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2004 O.J. (L 111) 3 (EC).
For the E.U. statute on market manipulation, consult Parliament and Council
Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 Jan. 2003, On Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation
(Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16.
52
PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
112–14 (Oxford 2003).
53
Id. at 113.
54
Id. at 114.
55
Id. at 115.
56
See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 62.
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released its Risk Management Guidelines for Derivatives in 1996
(Basel Guidelines).57 The Basle Guidelines enumerate five
fundamental risks: credit and settlement risk (counterparty’s failure
to perform under an obligation), market risk (risk stemming from
exogenous factors such as interest rate and currency rate
movements), liquidity risk (inability to offset a derivatives position
with a matching position in an illiquid market), operations risk
(human error and information systems failure), and legal risk
(unenforceability of a contract).58 The culmination or simultaneous
realization of these risks is often termed “systemic risk.”59
Awareness of these risks has been reflected in derivatives
regulations the world over, including regulations in the E.U. In the
FSAP, the Commission resolved to present proposals that would
maintain high standards of banking, insurance, and securities
legislation. To this end, taking into account the work of existing
bodies is helpful when possible (Basle Committee, FESCO, etc.).60
The first E.U. provision to deal with an aspect of derivatives
risk management antedated both FSAP and Basle guidelines. In
Directive 92/49/EEC, the Council stated that where insurance
companies use derivatives, member states must ensure that:
“derivative instruments…may be used in so far as they contribute
to a reduction of investment risks or facilitate efficient portfolio
management. They must be valued on a prudent basis and may be
taken into account in the valuation of the underlying assets.”61
Hinting at the substance of regulations to come, the Council’s
approach in Directive 92/49 evidenced concern that the market risk
associated with so-called “speculative derivatives use” might
endanger the cash flow and reserves of insurance providers. As a
result, E.U. regulators restricted insurance companies’ permitted
use of derivatives to hedging activities.

57
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE: RISK MANAGEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR DERIVATIVES (July 1994), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsc211.htm.
58
Id.
59
Krawiec, supra note 22, at 51.
60
FSAP, supra note 1, at 14.
61
Council Directive 92/49/EEC, supra note 5, art. 21(C)(iv), at 13. In addition,
Parliament and Council Directive 2002/83/EC, supra note 51, provides in nearly
identical terms that life insurance companies can only use derivatives to hedge.
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The “hedging only” standard still proved it insufficient to solve
the problem of speculative derivative use.62 Investors entered into
derivative securities contracts that—to the negligently or willfully
uninformed—appeared risk free, but which turned out to be highly
leveraged instruments.63 Hedging exercises turned into debacles. As
a result, the E.U. in a post-Barings, post-Parmalat, post-FSAP
world shifted its focus and enacted more specific provisions that
gave parties less room to “fudge.”
For instance, beyond imposing a restriction on insurance fund
managers to use derivatives only for hedging, post-FSAP
provisions impose a duty on brokers to ascertain the sophistication
and risk profile of their customers:
[Investment firms] shall obtain the necessary
information regarding the client’s or potential
client’s knowledge and experience in the investment
field relevant to the specific type of product or
service, his financial situation and his investment
objectives so as to enable the firm to recommend to
the client or potential client the investment services
and financial instruments that are suitable for him.64
More examples of prescriptive rules aimed at minimizing risk arise
in Directive 2001/108, amending an earlier directive on
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities
(UCITS).65 The Parliament and the Council addressed UCTIS to
investment and hedge funds of all stripes.66 Adding to the binding

62
See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 19 (noting the loss of hundreds of
millions of dollars through use of structured notes that seemed fit for hedging); FRANK
PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER 55–61
(Penguin Books 1999) (relating Morgan Stanley’s sale of principal exchange rate
linked securities (PERLS) seemingly benign derivatives that were involved in many
customer losses).
63
See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 19.
64
Parliament and Council Directive 2004/39/EC, supra note 51, ch. 2, § 2, art.
19(4), at 17.
65
Parliament and Council Directive 2001/108/EC, supra note 51, Preamble, at
36.
66
Council Directive 85/611/EEC of Dec. 1985, On the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective
Investment in Transferable Securities, art. 1(2), 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3. Article 1(2)
reads:
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obligation of brokers to assess customer risk tolerance, UCITS
provides that parties to an OTC derivatives transaction must
conduct ongoing assessment of their liquidity and market risk
exposure. Taken together, post-FSAP risk-management directives
give member states guidance aimed at more full integration of the
Basle standards into national law.
2. Legal risk: setoff and netting
As mentioned in the discussion of close-out netting under an
ISDA Master Agreement, a major risk in the derivatives setting is
the possibility that a bankruptcy administrator will selectively try to
enforce only those trades that are beneficial to the estate, in other
words, to cherry pick.67 Although the close-out netting provisions
of the Master Agreement attempt to deal with this legal risk, the
chance remains that a transaction might be subject to the laws of a
jurisdiction that does not recognize close-out netting.
The E.U. addresses this problem within its own borders in its
Insolvency Regulation.68 The Article 4(2) of the Insolvency
Regulation sets forth a general rule that: “The law of the State of
the opening of proceedings shall determine...the conditions under
which set-offs may be invoked.”69 In the bankruptcy context, a setoff is generally the right of a creditor to reduce obligations owed by
the bankrupt party—typically an unpaid debt—by an amount that
the creditor owes the bankrupt party—typically a deposit of the
bankrupt party.70 Set-off, although related, is substantively different
2. For the purposes of this Directive, and subject to Article 2,
UCITS shall be undertakings:
—the sole object of which is the collective investment in
transferable securities of capital raised from the public and which
operate on the principle of risk-spreading, and
—the units of which are, at the request of holders, re-purchased or
redeemed, directly or indirectly, out of those undertakings’ assets.
Action taken by a UCITS to ensure that the stock exchange value
of its units does not significantly vary from their net asset value
shall be regarded as equivalent to such re-purchase or redemption.
Id.
67

See Derham, supra note 43, at 537.
Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 51. The Insolvency Regulation has
been of direct application in the E.U. since May 31, 2002. Id.
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553 I(A) (2005).
68
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from close-out netting because it involves the reduction of one
mutual obligation. By contrast, close-out netting involves the
reduction of an unlimited number of obligations—with varying
amounts and maturities—to produce one sum that itself might be
subject to set-off. Because the drafters of the Insolvency Regulation
do not distinguish between set-off and netting—a distinction that
was drawn in at least one later E.U. statute71—it seems that the
drafters conflated the two, making the application of both close-out
netting and set-off subject to the laws of each member state law.
The general rule of Insolvency Regulation Article 4(2) dictates
that if the law of a given member state prohibits set-offs altogether
and a counterparty declares insolvency in that jurisdiction, the nonbankrupt counterparty in a derivatives transaction is subject to
cherry picking, thus preventing the execution of close-out netting or
the enjoyment of set-off rights. To counterbalance such situations,
E.U. legislators included Article 6(1), which provides that: “The
opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the right of
creditors to demand the set-off of their rights against the claims of
the debtor, where such a set-off is permitted by the law applicable
to the insolvent debtor’s claim.”72 Thus, as long as parties select
netting and set-off-friendly jurisdictions to govern their ISDA
Master Agreements (such as New York or the U.K.), the ability of
member state bankruptcy administrators to cherry pick is muted by
the Insolvency Regulation.
C. Clearance and Settlement
Two initial pieces of E.U. legislation addressed the topic of
clearance and settlement—Directive 98/26 and Directive 2000/12.
In subsequent legislation, Parliament remarked: “Directive
98/26…constituted a milestone in establishing a sound legal
framework for payment and securities settlement systems.
Implementation of that Directive has demonstrated the importance
of limiting systemic risk…and the benefits of common rules in
relation to collateral constituted to such systems.”73 Despite the

71

Parliament and Council Directive 2001/24/EC of 4 Apr. 2001, On the
Reorganisation and Winding Up of Credit Institutions, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 15, art. 25
(“Netting agreements shall be governed solely by the law of the contract which
governs such agreements.”).
72
Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 51, at 6.
73
Parliament and Council Directive 2002/47/EC, supra note 51, Preamble, at 43.
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changes affected by these initial two directives, settlement systems
in the E.U. remained fragmented and the market suffered under
resulting inefficiencies.74 The European Commission appointed the
Giovannini Group to help resolve this issue.
The Giovannini Group, led by Dr. Alberto Giovannini, formed
in 1996 to advise the European Commission on issues “relating to
EU financial integration and the efficiency of euro-denominated
financial markets.”75 In February 2002, the Group issued a report
on cross-border clearing and settlement arrangements. The Group
stated: “The existing infrastructure for the provision of clearing and
settlement services in the European Union is the product of a
fragmented securities market....[T]he additional cost and risk
associated with this fragmentation represents a significant
limitation on the scope for cross-border securities trading in the
European Union.”76
In an effort to improve the system, the Group identified key
market barriers that separated the settlement systems of member
countries—technology barriers, differences in user agreements and
market conventions—and encouraged a market-led convergence to
common standards.77 Recognizing that perverse incentives might
prevent market change, the Group accepted that E.U. intervention
might be required.78 In the end, the Giovannini Report found more
fragmentation in the settlement system for securities than for
derivatives markets.79
On June 6, 2002, the European Parliament and the Council
issued Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral arrangements. The
Parliament and Council tailored Directive 2002/47 to require use of
“a central counterparty, settlement agent or clearing house” in

74

Giovannini Report, supra note 29, at 19.
Id. at 1.
76
Id. at 20.
77
Id. at 59–60.
78
Id. at 60. Commenting in this regard, the Group wrote: “Such intervention
could prove unavoidable as a means to overcome national sensitivities and/or the
perverse incentives that exist for entities that profit by arbitraging inefficiencies in
cross-border clearing and settlement.” Id. at 67.
79
Id. at 7–19. The Group linked greater fragmentation in cross-border securities
settlement to the greater number of actors and thus greater complexity in a typical
cross-border securities transaction. Id.
75
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exchange-traded derivatives transactions to lessen the effects of
cross-boarder fragmentation.80
D. Accounting
The current story of derivatives accounting in the E.U. is the
story of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39. In July 2002,
the Parliament and the Council issued a regulation that mandated
obligatory application of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) as of January 1, 2005.81 Notably—like its law on
insolvency proceedings—the E.U. instituted this measure using a
regulation and not a directive.
On December 1, 2004, a reporter noted:
Few businesses...are as disgruntled with IFRS as the
banks and financial institutions. This is because of a
clause called IAS 39, which requires them to record
a range of financial instruments, such as derivatives
and bonds, at fair value on the balance sheet. Any
changes in the value of these instruments must then
be fed through the company’s income statement, or

80

Parliament and Council Directive 2002/47/EC, supra note 51, art. 1(2)(d). In
Parliament and Council Directive 98/26/EC, art. 2, the European Parliament and the
Council defined the main terms as follows:
(c) ‘central counterparty’ shall mean an entity which is
interposed between the institutions in a system and which acts as
the exclusive counterparty of these institutions with regard to their
transfer orders;
(d) ‘settlement agent’ shall mean an entity providing to
institutions and/or a central counterparty participating in systems,
settlement accounts through which transfer orders within such
systems are settled and, as the case may be, extending credit to
those institutions and/or central counterparties for settlement
purposes;
(e) ‘clearing house’ shall mean an entity responsible for the
calculation of the net positions of institutions, a possible central
counterparty and/or a possible settlement agent;
Parliament and Council Directive 98/26/EC, supra note 51, art. 2.
Parliament and Council Regulation 1606/2002, supra note 51.

81

255

I NTERNATIONAL L AW & M ANAGEMENT R EVIEW

V OLUME 2

else shown in shareholders’ equity, depending on
the instrument. The impact could be big, given that,
until recently, many financial assets and liabilities
have been recorded at historical cost rather than fair
value, or else not recorded on the balance sheet at
all.82
As indicated, the centerpiece of IAS 39 is greater use of fair value
for all financial instruments.83 The International Accounting
Standards Board stated: “Under this standard, all financial assets
and financial liabilities should be recognized on the balance sheet,
including all derivatives.... Subsequent to initial recognition, all
financial assets should be remeasured to fair value.”84
For exchange-traded derivatives, fair value is simply the market
value of a future or option at any given time.85 Upon creation of a
new balance sheet, all public companies with exchange-traded
derivatives positions must mark the derivatives to market as either
current assets or current liabilities. But what of OTC derivatives?
What is the value of a contract that might not have any
corresponding liquid market? In such situations, the first line of
defense is to assess whether a materially similar, already-priced
instrument exists.86 When this fails, a party can apply discounted
cash flow analysis or employ an approved option pricing model.87
Derivatives must be on the balance sheet and represented by some
measurement of fair value—unless, as it turns out, an exception
applies.
As the date of IFRS compliance drew near, the Commission
issued Regulation 707/2004 detailing how companies could comply
with IFRS.88 The new Regulation contained a carve-out that applied
to derivatives used in certain types of hedging transactions.89 The
carve-out began by stating: “An entity shall not reflect in
its...balance sheet a hedging relationship...that does not qualify for

82

When Fair’s Fair, BUS. EUR., Dec. 2004, at 2 (article available with Author
upon request).
83
INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING
STANDARDS 39-5 (2003) [hereinafter INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS].
84
Id. at 39-6.
85
Id. at 39-50.
86
Id. at 39-51.
87
Id.
88
Commission Regulation 707/2004, supra note 51.
89
Id. at 10.
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hedge accounting under IAS 39.”90 The provision then proceeded to
list transactions where derivatives would be exempt, including:
“many hedging relationships where the hedging instrument is a
cash instrument or written option; where the hedged item is a net
position; or where the hedge covers interest risk in a held-tomaturity investment.”91 Explaining this otherwise baffling
exemption, Jane Fuller writes for the Financial Times:
IAS39...has been seriously compromised by
objections, notably from French banks. They dislike
the way traditional hedging practices are excluded
from the hedge accounting definitions. As a result,
the European parliament has bowed to business
pressure and allowed “carve-outs”...from the markto-market requirements. The ability to compare
companies across borders has been diluted and a
dangerous precedent has been set that political
pressure can force changes to standards that are
supposed to be set independently.92
Thus, while adopting IAS 39 was a step in the right direction,
its E.U. implementation has yet to show whether the carve-out will
compromise the crucial underlying aim of more accurately
reflecting all the liabilities—and assets—of publicly traded
institutions.
E. Market Manipulation
Of the numerous E.U. regulations on derivatives, only one deals
directly with market manipulation.93 Directive 2003/6 applies to,
among others, exchange-based derivatives trades. Instead of
enumerating all possible forms of manipulation, the Directive
adopts a broad definition that accords member states power to
pierce manipulative practices in a substance-over-form manner.
Article 1(2)(a) provides that market manipulation means:

90

Id.
Id.
92
Jane Fuller, Does Europe’s Accounts Overhaul Add Up?, FT.COM, Nov. 22,
2004 (Westlaw).
93
Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC, supra note 51.
91
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[T]ransactions or orders to trade: [i] which give, or
are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to
the supply of, demand for or price of financial
instruments, or [ii] which secure, by a person, or
persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or
several financial instruments at an abnormal or
artificial level, unless the person who entered into
the transactions or issued the orders to trade
establishes that his reasons for so doing are
legitimate and that these transactions or orders to
trade conform to accepted market practices on the
regulated market concerned.94
In a classic move of “minimum harmonization,” the Parliament
and Council made clear that member states should impose
administrative sanctions against any who violate the antimanipulation provisions, but likewise stressed that member states
were free to impose extra criminal sanctions.95 “Member States
shall ensure that these measures are effective, proportionate and
dissuasive.”96
IV. IMPLEMENTING E.U. DERIVATIVES LEGISLATION IN POLAND
A. The Polish Derivatives Markets and Optimal
Enforcement Efforts
Despite E.U. legislators’ enactment of provisions to regulate
four key aspects of derivatives trading, the European Commission
cautioned that “[r]egulation alone does not deliver an integrated
single market. The extent to which the FSAP will contribute to…a
truly European market…now depends on the consistent and timely
implementation of the FSAP measures at Member State level,
convergence of national supervisory practices and rigorous
enforcement.”97
As E.U. and local officials promote and enforce derivatives
regulations in new member states, questions arise such as where
should they spend their efforts, which endeavors will carry the most

94
95
96
97
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Id. art. 1(2)(a), at 20.
Id. art. 14(1), at 23.
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Tenth Progress Report, supra note 1.
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utility, and what level of enforcement is optimal? One category—
settlement and clearance—although crucial to the fluid operation of
derivatives markets, does not require special government
enforcement action in the new member states. However, other
categories represent areas where E.U. and member state activism
can effect further change.
Government officials should not spend their efforts
concentrating on derivatives settlement and clearance. As a primary
matter, the Giovannini report found less fragmentation—and thus
less risk of inefficiency in the European markets—where futures
settlement and clearance was concerned.98 For futures transactions,
the E.U. simply mandates that all exchanges use a central
counterparty. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary all have
central counterparties that meet E.U. standards, and thus the work
of would-be enforcers is complete.
The management of market, credit, operational, and liquidity
risk is crucially important for the end-users of derivatives contracts.
Although the prevalence of discrete derivatives-related risks varies
across markets, the principles of risk management hold constant
whether the parties are in London, Frankfurt, Prague, or Warsaw.
However, to the extent that markets such as Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary might pose greater counterparty risk,
market risk, or other such Basle-identified risks, European or local
officials have limited capacity to minimize the risk. European and
Polish legislatures took the important step of promulgating specific
norms, and now the task lies in the hands of market participants to
carefully follow sound practices as they enter into and service their
derivatives contracts. Most solutions to market, counterparty,
liquidity, and other risks will have to be market solutions, not
solutions dictated or enforced from a central authority.
One notable exception to this rule lies in market manipulation,
which embody hazards that require the attention of local and E.U.
regulators. Market manipulation is a prime concern in new member
states due to the size of Eastern European exchanges, which—
despite recent progress—are significantly smaller and less liquid
than leading exchanges in London, Frankfurt, and other financial
centers. Recent corporate finance literature confirms that
manipulation occurs much more often when exchanges are
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relatively small, illiquid, and volatile.99 Underscoring this reality,
the WSE has experienced recent instances of futures-trading
manipulation. Since manipulation tends to be easier in smaller
markets, E.U. market-manipulation provisions are a prime concern
at the local level, particularly for local prosecutors.
In like manner, the legal risk stemming from a specific
provision of the Polish Bankruptcy Law of 2003 makes it possible
that, despite the E.U. Insolvency Regulation, parties to an ISDA
Master Agreement who have chosen Polish law as the law
governing their trades could be subject to cherry picking by Polish
bankruptcy administrators.100 Polish legislators must be aware of
this risk and work to counteract the possible inequitable effects
created by the bankruptcy statute.
Whereas market manipulation and close-out netting pose
special problems for Poland and other Eastern European markets,
derivatives accounting standards pose a general problem for all
E.U. member states. The carve-out introduced by European
legislators into IAS 39 has such broad application that it threatens
to swallow the rule that companies must reflect all derivatives
liabilities on their balance sheets. In light of recent derivativesrelated accounting scandals in the United States, European and
member-state regulators would do well to carefully scrutinize how
99

See Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Guojun Wu, Student Article, Stock Market
Manipulation—Theory and Evidence, 79 J. BUS. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at
22–24, available at http://www.afajof.org/pdfs/2004program/UPDF/P306_Asset_
Pricing.pdf). In the context of American markets, Rajesh Aggarwal and Guojun Wu
explain:
For example, 47.89% of all manipulation cases happen in the
over-the-counter markets such as the OTC Bulletin Board and the
Pink Sheets, and 33.81% of the cases happen in either regional
exchanges or unidentified markets. About 17% of the cases occur
on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq National Market combined.
Overall, the OTC Bulletin Board, the Pink Sheets, and the regional
exchanges are relatively inefficient in the sense that they are small
and illiquid…Our results show that about over 50% of the stocks
manipulated are “penny stocks” with very low average trading
volume and market capitalization.
Id. See also Paul G. Mahoney et al., Market Manipulation: A Comprehensive
Study of Stock Pools, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 147–70 (2005), available at http://www.science
direct.com (requires password).
100
Ustawa z dnia 28 lutego 2003 r. Prawo upadłościowe i naprawcze [Statute of
Feb. 28, 2003 on the Law of Bankruptcy and Workouts], Dz.U 2003 nr. 60 poz. 535
[hereinafter Polish Bankruptcy Law].
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companies are accounting for their derivatives contracts. To the
extent that financial managers in Poland—or anywhere else—can
exclude derivatives from the balance sheet or record them at
historical cost, they can hide risk and potentially place investor
welfare on the altar of smooth earnings. The following subsections
will first discuss market manipulation, followed by accounting
standards.
B. Market Manipulation on the Polish Futures Exchange
1. Background and the “100 second” scandal
Futures trading on the WSE began in 1998, and futures
represent the quickest growing sector of the WSE.101 The exchange
makes it possible for investors to trade futures in euros, U.S.
dollars, Polish treasury bonds, and certain WSE-listed stocks. In
2003, the WSE recorded 4.2 million futures trades, representing an
increase of approximately 1 million from the previous year.102
Although developing robustly, the Warsaw futures exchange pales
in comparison to world exchanges such as the Korea Futures
Exchange—2.5 billion trades in 2004—or the Eurex—1.1 billion
trades in 2004.103 Most futures trades on the WSE—some ninetyeight percent—take place on the exchange’s “WIG 20,” which is an
index of the WSE’s twenty blue-chip listed companies.104
WSE options trading is not as mature as its futures counterpart,
having only started operation on September 22, 2003.105 The WSE
created its options exchange to complement its offering of
derivatives that have the WIG 20 as their underlying asset.
One Polish observer recently commented: “The [exchangetraded] market for forward contracts, especially futures trading on
the WIG 20, can be acknowledged as developed. Confirming this
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zrodla/gpw/pdf/090104opcje.pdf.
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Derivatives Press Release, supra note 102, at 1.
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Warsaw Stock Exchange, Opcje na GPW [Option Contracts on the WSE]
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fact are not only statistical data, but also the scandals that have
begun to accompany such contracts.”106 The most prominent
scandal in relation to WIG 20 futures trading took place on
February 4, 2004.107
Near the end of the day’s trading session, an investor from the
Virgin Islands placed a number of large sell orders in quick
succession through its broker.108 The sell orders set off an
avalanche of stop orders—standing instructions from an investor in
a futures trade to its broker not to sell below a certain price in order
to hedge against losses—and the futures price fell 108 trading
points.109 Seconds later, as if anticipating the drop, the same broker
placed a string of buy orders and the price spiked upward roughly
260 points as other investors piled on.110 When the dust settled one
hundred seconds later, 307 investors had made PLN 5.4 million,
777 investors had lost PLN 5.4 million, and the Virgin Islands
investor netted PLN 2.6 million.111 One reporter noted that some
individual investors lost all of the money in their margin accounts,
forcing them to leave the exchange altogether.112 Investors began to
refer to the incident as the WSE’s “notorious 100 seconds.”113
Commentators dubbed the matter one of the greatest scandals in
WSE history,114 and they expressed fears about what such
manipulation could mean for overall investment:
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Krawczyk, supra note 12.
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If investors do not have equal market opportunity
and at any moment may get “worked over” for big
money, as if they were facing a street hoodlum, no
investor will want to “play” in such a market—they
will either take their game somewhere else or stop
investing. The Polish exchange could, in short
order, become a worthless market, where only a
handful of investors along with some pension and
investment funds will come to play. Neither the
WSE nor the KPWiG [Polish Securities and
Exchange Commission (the Polish SEC)] likely
wants such a situation.115
On one hand, the scandal appeared to be classic manipulation
that could occur in any market with inefficiencies. The manipulator
establishes a price trend and then profits by trading against it.116 On
the other hand, the debacle had everything to do with the special
nature of futures and their associated stop-loss orders. “Stop-order
gunning” is the term investors use to describe the tactic of
triggering multiple stop orders at once in order to manipulate
prices. The manipulator in this case timed the effects of his gunning
perfectly.117 Various sources in the Polish press suggest that the
incident was not an isolated instance of stop-order gunning—at
least three other similar incidents occurred.118
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See 100 Seconds of Scandal, supra note 114.
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First Half of 2004], EUROBANKIER.PL, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://euro.bankier.
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2. Official reactions to the scandal and legislative development
under Polish law
Two minutes after the 100-second incident came to a close, the
Polish SEC had already begun to scrutinize all of the involved
transactions—who had gained and who had lost.119 In a press
conference, Jacek Socha, chairman of the Polish SEC, clarified that
their initial efforts concentrated on discovering whether the
incident had occurred pursuant to broker error or actual fraud.120
One week later, Socha declared: “There can be no doubt that the
events of last Wednesday were of a criminal character.”121
On the Thursday following the incident, the Polish SEC had
informed both the General Inspector of Financial Information and
the Internal Security Agency of wrongdoing. The general inspector
froze the order-placing investor’s Polish bank accounts.122 Polish
SEC investigation further revealed that the person who actually
placed the orders was not an authorized broker.123 The broker, from
the Polish brokerage house PKO BP, had given his access code to
an office friend—in contravention of Polish securities regulation—
who then placed the orders. The Polish SEC suspended the broker
for six months, and PKO BP moved quickly to dismiss both the
broker and his colleague.124
By March 19, at least ninety investors had turned to the
Individual Investors Association for help in seeking restitution.125
PKO BP offered to allow all injured investors to set up brokerage
accounts on preferential terms, a move that the Association deemed
an insult.126 The Association and its investors preferred initiating a
civil action against PKO BP, but bemoaned lack of clarity in the
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Polish statutory scheme and lack of desire on the part of
prosecutors to bring criminal charges:
Documenting a definition of manipulation is
fundamentally important. In the [Warsaw]
prosecutor’s office, the head of the division for
crimes in the capital markets represented the train
of thought shared by judges and, lamentably,
prosecutors. The thrust seems to be that if there is
no concrete provision spelling out what constitutes
manipulation, then manipulation never occurred.
This rigid, legalistic approach has, according to
judicial statistics, prevented any change in this area
for years.127
The opaque statute to which the Association referred was
Poland’s 1997 Law on the Public Trade of Securities. 128 Following
passage of the 1997 law—and as Poland began to prepare for E.U.
accession—Polish legislators worked to amend the statute so that it
would reflect E.U. standards. As amended on December 8, 2000,
the statute included “crimes in opposition to the public exchange of
securities” and provided public prosecutors with the power, in
accordance with existing law, to bring charges where such crimes
occurred.129 Although Polish lawmakers clearly included exchangetraded derivatives, nowhere did their amendment describe the
various forms that criminal securities violations might take.130
Instead, the statute simply acknowledged the existence of such
crimes and empowered prosecutors to act as they saw fit.

127

Stowarzyszenie Inwestorów Indywidualnych [Individual Investors Ass’n], 4
lutego na rynku futures—ciąg dalszy nastąpi [4 Feb. on the Futures Exchange—To Be
Continued], ONET.PL (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://gielda.onet.pl/0,1156246,
komentarze.html.
128
Ustawa z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. Prawo o publicznym obrocie papierami
wartościowymi [Law of 27 Sept. 1997, Statute on the Public Trade of Securities]
(Dz.U. z 1997 r. Nr 118 poz. 754) [hereinafter Polish Securities Law].
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Although fully able to act under the securities law amendments
of 2000, Warsaw prosecutors initially did nothing to prosecute the
February 4 manipulation.131 In contrast to this law enforcement
inertia, the Polish Sejm (parliament) approved and published
further amendments to the 1997 securities law on March 12,
2004.132 In introducing the amendments, Polish legislators noted:
“This law accomplishes, in the scope of its regulation,
incorporation of...[E.U.] directive 2003/6...[in the matter of] market
manipulation.”133 Article 97 of the updated statute explicitly
addressed market manipulation, adopting almost word-for-word the
broad-brush definition of manipulation suggested by the E.U. in its
Directive:
(1) Manipulation of financial instruments, hereafter
“manipulation,” is prohibited. (2) Manipulation
shall be...placing orders, entering into transactions
or undertaking other actions which give, or are
likely to give, false signals as to the demand for,
supply of, or price of financial instruments unless
the reasons for entering into such actions were
legitimate, and such orders, transactions, or other
actions did not violate accepted market practices on
the regulated market concerned.134
As in the E.U. directive, Polish legislators chose not to
prescriptively define manipulation, opting instead to outline general
conduct in a way that gives law enforcement agencies latitude in
pursuing criminal action.
Further, Polish legislators stiffened the proposed penalty for
perpetrating market manipulation. In addition to the administrative
sanctions that the E.U. suggested in Directive 2003/6, which gives
the Polish SEC power to impose fines, the Polish government
reserved the right to fine offenders up to PLN 5 million or impose a
prison sentence of up to five years or both.135 All of the March 12
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amendments to the Polish securities statute took effect on May 1,
2004, the day that Poland entered the E.U.136
By April 2004, indications began to appear that the malefactors
of February 4 might meet justice after all. Although the Internal
Security Agency (ISA) had yet to pin down the identity of the
investor behind the “100 second” manipulation, the Warsaw
prosecutor used ISA agents to apprehend the PKO BP broker and
his order-placing accomplice on April 5.137 The prosecutor
subjected both individuals to constant supervision and prohibited
them from leaving the country.138 In September, a report arose
suggesting that the Warsaw prosecutor would press charges against
both parties.139
However, charges never arose. One year after the scandal took
place, on February 4, 2005, Andrzej Stec wrote for the Gazeta
Wyborcza, Poland’s largest newspaper:
It initially seemed that justice would be satisfied.
The [Polish SEC] gauged the accounts of the secret
investor and its agent in rapid tempo.... [Now]
however, injured investors possess less and less
hope that the guilty will meet punishment. As of
today, no charges have arisen, the accounts of the
investor were unblocked, and the money
disappeared—probably to Switzerland.140
The Warsaw prosecutor’s reply to such concerns was twofold.
Fundamentally, the reply claimed securities cases simply require a
long time to prepare and execute. Moreover, it underscored the fact
that its division for prosecuting securities crimes had only six
attorneys, each of whom had an average of ten active Polish SEC–
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referred cases.141 The prosecutor claimed charges could be filed as
soon as May 2005, however, charges have yet to arise.142
It remains unclear why the WSE did not simply suspend trading
when prices began to drop on February 4, 2004. Section 142 of the
exchange’s regulations provides that the WSE will suspend trading
whenever the price of a traded security varies, at most, more than ±
ten percent from the normal trading price.143 Traders refer to such
provisions for automatic suspension as “circuit breakers.”144 One
analyst noted that the execution of the “100 second” trade took
place in such a manner that neither the initial dip nor the resulting
spike in trading prices tripped the WSE circuit breakers (although
both came quite close).145 As a result, the WSE modified the
futures-trading variance that it would tolerate before suspending
trade to five percent instead of ten percent.146
3. Assessment and suggestions
The solution to manipulation of the Polish futures exchange and
other comparably sized exchanges is clear-cut: increase liquidity
and market capitalization. As trade volume and market
transparency increase, other investors price out would-be
manipulators and thus destroy their ability to manipulate the
market. The solution, however, poses a paradox. For manipulation
to cease, Poland must have a thicker market; but market
manipulation undermines the necessary investor confidence needed
to induce large scale spending.
Technical fixes, such as the WSE circuit breaker modification,
seem unlikely to resolve the problem. Many commentators have
observed that circuit breakers often work to impede normal
trading.147 Economist Merton Miller remarked that, by their design,
circuit breakers “shut down the markets and stop business from
141
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being done.”148 Miller’s comment seems all the more pertinent for
markets like Poland where trading is naturally more volatile and
thus more likely to trip circuit breakers and suspend trading.
Proponents of circuit breakers argue that allowing investors to
digest needed information and make rational decisions when
trading varies significantly from normal volumes mitigates the
inconvenience caused by such technical fixes. However, instances
such as the “100 second” scandal prove otherwise. Providing only a
false sense of security, circuit breakers and other technical
remedies simply add an extra element of contest for manipulators
who wish to abuse the market.149
Merely providing a definition of manipulation that covers most
or all of the conduct that regulators deem unlawful will not solve
the paradox. Jerry Markham, former chief counsel for the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), remarked: “[I]t
may be appropriate to maintain a residual broad prohibition against
manipulation that will sweep up unusual or novel manipulation
techniques....[However,] a completely different regulatory approach
is needed to attack the concerns raised by manipulation.”150
The “completely different approach” that Markham
advocated—in the context of discussing apparent CFTC failure to
stifle manipulation in U.S. commodity futures trading—centered on
creation of a “fair and orderly market” as opposed to a laissez-faire
system of trading.151
The concept of a fair and orderly market would lead
to an overall approach of prevention, intervention
and prosecution....The purpose of maintaining an
orderly market is to assure that prices reflect actual
conditions and are not the result of disruptive
trading by powerful market forces that have the
wherewithal to unduly affect prices. The
requirement of a fair and orderly market reflects a
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social judgment that large traders should not be
permitted to abuse these markets by causing
disruptions affecting consumers and the economy in
general....All of these efforts must be coupled with
an effective program of prosecution. This program
must provide for both criminal and civil
penalties.152
Markham’s “different approach” seems well suited to remedy the
Polish paradox. Due to the relatively fragile state of this market, the
Polish futures exchange officials must regulate in a way that will
bolster investor confidence. Confidence will follow in the wake of
regulation and enforcement that reflect investor sentiment that
“large traders should not be permitted” to abuse and disrupt futures
trading.
Concerned less with laissez-faire and more with boosting
investor confidence, authorities of the Polish securities commission
and the Warsaw exchange have already worked hard to implement
two of the three “Markham Approach” criteria—prevention and
intervention. Evidence suggests that the Polish SEC and WSE have
tried to prevent market manipulation. One such prophylactic,
though largely ineffective method, is the imposition of circuit
breakers that the WSE has put in place. Further, the Polish SEC has
observers who actively monitor the price and volume of trades on
the futures exchange, as evidenced by the commission employees
who examined the “100 second” trades only moments after they
took place.153 Although one could argue that it acted too slowly, the
Polish SEC did intervene by freezing the investor’s accounts,
suspending the involved brokers, and informing the prosecutor’s
office. In an attempt at effective intervention, each year the Polish
SEC refers dozens of cases to the Prosecutor’s office.154
Unfortunately, referral is often where the trail ends.
In the decade from 1994 to 2004, the Warsaw prosecutor’s
office pressed charges in only twenty-three percent of the cases
referred by the Polish SEC—an annual average of nine
prosecutions for every thirty-seven referrals.155 Presumably, the
ratio of convictions to referred cases is much lower. Herein lies the
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failure of Poland’s futures exchange to reflect the ideal of a “fair
and orderly market.” The securities commission and the exchange
are limited in their efforts to prevent and intervene when no
manipulator faces the prospect of effective and conclusive
prosecution. Markham stresses that effective regulation of
manipulation in the futures context must include criminal
prosecution that is concentrated (i.e., “sufficiently pointed in
attacking particular practices”), quick, and efficient.156
The March 12 amendments to Poland’s securities law allow for
“concentrated” criminal prosecution because they specify practices
that prosecutors can identify and pursue. Lawmakers can give a
working definition of manipulation that facilitates concentrated
prosecution; however, quick and efficient prosecution cannot be
legislated. Complicating quick and efficient prosecution of the “100
second” offenders is the fact that prosecutors cannot retroactively
apply a March 2004 statute to conduct that occurred in February
2004. This objection to retroactive application, however, poses no
real practical concern since prosecutors were and remain free to use
the securities law as it existed in 2000 to prosecute “crimes in
opposition to the public exchange of securities.”157 Working with
such broad statutory language, prosecutors have latitude to single
out the criminals of February 4 and impose criminal sanctions.
Beyond the “100 second incident,” the Warsaw prosecutor’s
office must take an affirmative role in assisting the Polish SEC and
the WSE in their efforts to regulate the Polish futures market. One
step that the prosecutor’s office might take would be to increase the
number of personnel employed to work on securities related crimes.
Understaffing in the securities arena, however, seems more of a
pretext than an actual impediment. Six prosecutors might not be
able to successfully prosecute thirty-seven cases annually, but one
presumes that nine cases a year—one-and-a-half actions per
prosecutor—is low.158
The dismal ratio of prosecutions to filed charges strongly
suggests that lack of training and motivation lie at the heart of the
problem. Raising the number of prosecutors might help, but
Warsaw prosecutors must likewise seek E.U. funding and guidance
in an effort to train prosecutors to take more effective legal action
against instances of manipulation. Newly enacted E.U. provisions

156
157
158

Markham, supra note 117, at 374.
2000 Amendments, supra note 129.
100 Seconds a Year Later, supra note 140.

271

I NTERNATIONAL L AW & M ANAGEMENT R EVIEW

V OLUME 2

can and should be a call to action for law enforcers in Poland and
other new member states. Where clearly defined national norms did
not exist previously, E.U. guidance has filled the void. Although
European regulators seek implementation of post-FSAP measures,
the reaction of Polish prosecutors to the February 4 scandal after
implementation of Directive 2003/6 shows that local regulators
have yet to fully assume the challenge. As a result, one cannot yet
gauge whether administrative and criminal sanctions at the local
level will achieve “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”
outcomes.159
C. Legal Risk in the Polish OTC Derivatives Market: The Credit
Support Annex and Close-out Netting
Poland is largely a jurisdiction where the law permits close-out
netting.160 In an opinion commissioned by ISDA members, the
Warsaw office of Allen & Overy comments generally that close-out
netting “would be enforceable under Polish law in the event of
voluntary or involuntary winding up proceedings in respect of a
Polish entity.”161 However, this generally favorable situation can be
complicated when the parties enter into a Credit Support Annex
(CSA) under the ISDA Master Agreement.
The CSA under an ISDA Master Agreement serves essentially
the same function as a mandated margin account in the exchangetraded context. The CSA allows one or both parties to pledge
collateral based on the value at risk in a given transaction.162 As
part of the ISDA Master Agreement’s “single agreement”
framework, the CSA is intended to be netted with and rolled into
the calculation of all other close-out payments when one party
defaults or becomes insolvent.163 The Polish Bankruptcy Law of
2003 prevents this from happening when the ISDA Master
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Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC, supra note 51.
Memorandum of Law from Allen & Overy (Warsaw) for the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association on Enforceability Under Polish Law of Close-out
Netting of Privately Negotiated Derivatives Transactions Under the 1992 ISDA
Master Agreement and the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement (Feb. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
Polish Netting Memorandum] (on file with author).
161
Id. at 6.
162
INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, USER’S GUIDE TO THE ISDA CREDIT
SUPPORT DOCUMENTS UNDER ENGLISH LAW 2 (1995). The workings of the CSA under
New York law are essentially similar.
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Id. at 5; 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 11.
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Agreement is subject to Polish law, making the CSA amount a sum
that could potentially be cherry picked by a Polish bankruptcy
administrator.164
The Polish Netting Opinion explains that “[t]ermination
provisions of the Master Agreement [including close-out netting]
may not apply to any transactions that do not qualify as ‘term
financial transactions’ under Article 85.3 of the [Polish]
Bankruptcy Law.”165 In turn, Article 85.2 of the Polish Bankruptcy
Law defines term financial transactions as transactions “with a
specified price, quotation, interest rate or index, and in particular
the acquisition of funds, securities…entered into for settlement on a
specified date or for a specified period of time, on the market
place.”166 The CSA falls outside of the sphere of transactions
qualifying for close-out netting under Polish law.
This legislative bind could matter in the following situation.
Suppose that two parties, a Polish bank and a Polish oil company,
have many open derivatives trades under an ISDA Master
Agreement governed by Polish law. They enter into a large interest
rate swap to hedge the oil company’s exposure to one of its
creditors. Given the size and significance of the swap, the parties
decide to enter into a CSA in relation to the swap so that each will
be able to pledge funds to cover any open position. As time
progresses, the swap moves in the oil company’s favor and the bank
sets aside money in an escrow fund established under the CSA. The
oil company then declares bankruptcy and soon after tries to apply
close-out netting. The calculation netting all open trades
outstanding between the bank and the oil company—including the
CSA amount—produces a net sum owed to the bank. However,
since investors cannot add the CSA to the netting equation under
the Polish Bankruptcy Law, the amount remains outstanding in the
oil company’s favor and the Polish bankruptcy administrator is free
to claim the amount for the bankrupt estate.
One solution to this problem might simply be for the parties to
make their agreement subject to a jurisdiction where this problem
does not arise. However, due to raised transaction and potential
dispute costs, many parties may wish to continue trading under
Polish law. In order to make the regime for close-out netting more

164
Polish Netting Memorandum, supra note 160, at 5, 7; Polish Bankruptcy
Law, supra note 100, at 132.
165
Polish Netting Memorandum, supra note 160, at 7.
166
Id. at 5, 7; Polish Bankruptcy Law, supra note 100, at 132.
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equitable for both parties, Polish legislators must update the
Bankruptcy Statute to allow agreements such as the CSA to fall
within the purview of transactions in which netting is permissible in
bankruptcy. Doing so would move the Polish market closer to the
ideal of the E.U. as expressed in its Insolvency Regulation, where
legislators sought to preserve the rights of creditors to set-off their
claims against the claims of parties in bankruptcy.167
D. Derivatives Accounting Standards and the Polish OTC Market
1. The quest to smooth earnings
Recent U.S. headliners AIG and Fannie Mae demonstrate a
familiar story about financial managers who seek to smooth
earnings and hide financial risk.168 Other recent literature in both
law and finance sets forth the contours as follows.169 In the late
1980s, executive salaries in publicly traded companies increasingly
began to depend on equity compensation.170 Managers whose salary
was part equity had special incentive to please the market and
increase share price. A crucial aspect of pleasing the market
centered on meeting the projections of analysts who tell the market
what to expect from given companies. The price for failing to meet
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See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 51.
See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald & Jenny Anderson, How a Titan of Insurance Ran
Afoul of the Government, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/04/business/04aig.html (noting that the SEC began
its investigation upon seeing an A.I.G. brochure advertising how a “product deemed
‘loss mitigation insurance’ could be used by public companies to present smooth
earnings performance to investors, even amid losses”); School for Scandal: Dangers
of the US Mortgage Giant’s Special Status, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at 16 (noting
that “the result of Fannie’s hedge accounting exercise was to smooth earnings by
neutralising the impact of marking derivatives to market”).
169
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); Adriaen M. Morse,
Jr., Breaking the Circle: The Problem of Independent Directors Policing Public
Company Financial Disclosure Under the SEC’s New Rules Governing Public
Company Audit Committees, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 673, at 674 (2004);
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, S.E.C., Remarks at the NYU Center for Law and Business,
The
“Numbers
Game,”
(Sept.
28,
1998),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
170
See Coffee, supra note 169, at 274–75; see also Tom Nohel & Steven Todd,
Compensation for Managers with Career Concerns: The Role of Stock Options in
Optimal Contracts, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 229 (2005).
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analyst expectations—even slightly—is investor stock-dumping.171
Thus, managers strove to either hit analyst forecasts or exceed them
to the extent possible. Commenting on the tendency for investment
banks to override common business sense, former SEC chairman
Arthur Leavitt said: “Too many corporate managers, auditors, and
analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks. In the zeal to
satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings
path, wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful
representation.”172
Corporate managers have repeatedly played this game in their
treatment of derivative financial instruments. To smooth earnings,
financial managers can and do try to manipulate accounting rules in
deciding when and how to recognize a gain or loss on a derivative
contract.173 This problem is not unique to American shores as the
Financial Times reports similar problems in Europe:
Managements—at French banks, for instance—are
reluctant to give up techniques [in the treatment of
derivatives] that help them “smooth” earnings from
one year to another. Their assumption is that users
of accounts prefer smoothed outcomes.… As for
smoothing the accounts, that was one of the motives
that led Fannie Mae, the U.S. mortgage finance
provider, allegedly to flout FAS 133, the U.S.
equivalent of IAS 39. According to Fannie’s
regulator, smoothing became manipulation of
earnings—to which executive bonuses were
related.174
The implicit lesson for regulators is that wherever fluid capital
markets, analyst projections, equity driven management, and
171

See Coffee, supra note 169, at 277.
Levitt, supra note 169.
173
See School for Scandal, supra note 168 (noting that Fannie Mae
inappropriately applied hedge accounting to some of its derivatives contracts in
contravention of FAS 133); Elizabeth MacDonald, Kicking Fannie, FORBES, Mar. 14,
2005, at 110 (noting that Fannie Mae “incorrectly…smoothed out earnings by
temporarily ignoring the day-to-day fluctuations in the value of the derivative
contracts it uses to hedge interest rate risks”); see also Monica S. Tew, Notes &
Comments, The Dark Side of Derivatives: A Book Note on Infectious Greed: How
Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets by Frank Partnoy, 8 N.C. BANKING
INST. 289 (2004) (commenting on improper accounting for derivatives by Enron).
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Fuller, supra note 92.
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derivatives converge—a convergence that seems to be materializing
in Poland—management might feel pressured to manipulate
earnings and OTC derivatives could be one tool utilized in the
effort to do so.
This pressure to manipulate earnings is precisely why IAS 39
requires firms to place derivatives on the balance sheet at fair value
as an asset or a liability. When regulations require companies to
make full disclosure they have less ability to hide risk (assuming no
foul play). However, the European Commission’s IAS 39 carve-out
compromises this objective. Where American firms must overtly
flout accounting standards to achieve artificially smoothed
outcomes, firms in the E.U. need only exploit a prepackaged carveout, giving reason to wonder whether abuse of the provision could
occur in the Polish market.
2. The Polish market and the possibility of carve-out exploitation
OTC derivatives–related developments in Poland merit special
attention for a number of reasons. As discussed in the introduction,
Polish OTC derivatives trading has consistently risen since 1995.175
In 2004, Poland’s average daily turnover in reported OTC
derivatives stood at US$6 billion, more than the Czech Republic
and Hungary combined. Citing just one example, PKN Orlen—
Poland’s largest petrochemical company and the largest company
listed on the WSE—boosted the fair-value amount of its derivatives
by 387% from PLN 23 million to PLN 89 million in the one year
period from 2002 to 2003.176
A large portion of Poland’s everyday OTC trading volume
passes through Poland’s biggest banks. The Bank for International

175
BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at 19; BIS Derivatives Survey
1998, supra note 11, at 19.
176
PKN ORLEN, 2003 RAPORT ROCZNY [ANNUAL REPORT] 138 (2004). Orlen,
like all public companies in Poland, prepares its financial statements according to the
IASB International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Under IFRS, fair value is
“the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction.” INT’L FIN. REPORTING
STANDARDS, supra note 83, at 39-15. In other words, the growth in PKN’s derivatives
use does not merely represent a growth in the notional amount of the derivatives that it
uses, but a growth in the so-called “value at risk.” This fair-value, value-at-risk
amount represents PKN’s actual exposure. In U.S. dollars, the cited figures represent
growth from about $7 million to about $25 million.
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Settlements (BIS) provides the following breakdowns for OTC
trading in Poland:177
OTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES TURNOVER
BY COUNTERPARTY IN APRIL 2004
POLAND DAILY AVERAGES
NET TURNOVER
(IN MILLIONS USD)
With Reporting Local Dealers
337
With Reporting Dealers Abroad
2783
With Other Financial Institutions
1095
With Nonfinancial Customers
389
Total
4604
Gross Turnover
4941

OTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES TURNOVER
BY COUNTERPARTY IN APRIL 2004

With Non-Financial
Customers | 8%

With Reporting
Local Dealers | 7%

With Financial Institutions
24%

With Reporting
Dealers Abroad | 61%

Fig. 2 (created by the author on the basis of BIS figures)

177

BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11.

277

I NTERNATIONAL L AW & M ANAGEMENT R EVIEW

V OLUME 2

OTC SINGLE CURRENCY INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES TURNOVER
BY COUNTERPARTY IN APRIL 2004
POLAND DAILY AVERAGES
NET TURNOVER
(IN MILLIONS USD)
With Reporting Local Dealers
270
With Reporting Dealers Abroad
501
With Other Financial Institutions
172
With Nonfinancial Customers
15
Total
958
Gross Turnover
1228
OTC SINGLE CURRENCY INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES TURNOVER
BY COUNTERPARTY IN APRIL 2004

With Non-Financial Customers
2%
With Other Financial
Institutions
18%

With Reporting Dealers Abroad
52%

Fig. 3 (created by the author on the basis of BIS figures)
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BIS defines “reporting local dealers” and “other financial
institutions” to include commercial and investment banks,
insurance companies, brokerage houses, and so forth. In sum,
Polish reporting local dealers and other financial institutions share
approximately US$1.8 billion of daily OTC derivative turnover.
Public trading of many, if not most, of these institutions occurs on
the WSE, and all of these institutions are subject to IAS 39.
On August 27, 2004, the Sejm amended its 1994 statute on
accounting standards.178 Prior to the amendments, Polish banks and
publicly traded companies had prepared financial statements
according to Polish accounting standards. The 2004 amendments
recognized that beginning January 1, 2005, publicly traded Polish
companies and all Polish banks would prepare financial statements
in accordance with international financial reporting standards and
E.U. interpretations of those standards.179 Of course, part of the
E.U. interpretation of IFRS includes Regulation 707/2004, which
introduced the carve-out to IAS 39. As a result, Polish
institutions—banks in particular—that use derivatives are free
under Polish and E.U. law to exclude those derivatives from the
balance sheet or to mark them at unfair values as long as such
derivatives fit the categories specified in the carve-out.
Another reason to look closely at the Polish market is that
Polish companies are increasingly coming under the scrutiny of
foreign investors and analysts. In March 2005, International
Securities Finance reported:
Morley has launched a Central European long/short
fund to be wholly managed and invested in
Poland....Commenting on the launch of the fund,
Ian Ainscow, head of international business
development at Morley Fund Management, said:
“The EU accession earlier this year has resulted in
increased investor interest in Central European
economies….We have seen increased demand for

178

Ustawa z dnia 29 września 1994 r. o rachunkowości [Statute of 29 Sept. 1994
on Accounting], arts. 2(3), 45, 55 (Dz.U. z 2002 r. Nr 76 poz. 694), at 2, 46–47, 54;
Ustawa z dnia 27 sierpnia 2004 r. o zmianie ustawy o rachunkowości oraz o zmianie
ustawy o biegłych rewidentach i ich samorządzie [Statute of 27 Aug. 2004 Amending
the Statute on Accounting and Amending the Statute on Auditors and Their SelfRegulation], art. 1 (Dz.U z 2004 r. Nr 213 poz. 2155), at 1 [hereinafter Accounting
Law Amendment].
179
See Accounting Law Amendment, supra note 178, art. 1, at 1–2.
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alternative investment products and the launch of
this fund offers new diversification possibilities to a
range of sophisticated investors.”180
Another such development was the announcement in February
2005 that the WSE approved Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein
(DrKW) as its first investment bank foreign member.181 As of April
1, 2005, DrKW—one of Europe’s leading investment banks—has
made available a slate of institutional investors who will provide
Polish businesses well heeled purchasers for their public offerings.
Matthias Rode, head of equity flow derivatives for DrKW in
Frankfurt, commented:
Since Poland’s accession to the EU, our
institutional clients in Western Europe—including
mutual and hedge funds—have shown a great
interest in the Polish market and so we see
significant growth potential for our new product.
The Polish equity market is attractive to our clients
because it has depth and maturity with a number of
liquid stocks, good daily turnover and a well
developed derivatives market.182
As the eyes of foreign and local investors begin to focus on
publicly traded Polish companies, those companies will
increasingly feel the same pressure as their Western European and
American counterparts to produce smooth outcomes. Strategic
derivatives accounting, including the familiar game of winks and
nods, might conceivably emerge in a market where managers face
mounting pressure to meet analyst predictions, contemplate the
prospect of personal gain (or the spectacle of personal loss), and
evaluate the available means for achieving desired outcomes at low
cost. To the extent that Polish publicly traded companies can
exploit the carve-out in IAS 39, the Polish market might see
debacles comparable to AIG and Fannie Mae.
Gauging the scope of this risk is difficult. To do so would
require examining both public and nonpublic financial data on
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Polish Market Proves a Draw, supra note 19.
Press Release, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, supra note 19; see also
Polish Market Proves a Draw, supra note 19.
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banks, publicly traded companies, and the projections of various
investment banks and other analysts. Ideally, a significant
correlation would exist between analyst projections, a company’s
earnings, and the timing and manner with which a company or bank
closes out its derivatives contracts. An undertaking of this scale is
beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead, this work briefly
examines one prominent Polish bank that is a WSE blue chip and
assesses whether the bank’s situation allows it to exploit IAS 39 as
understood in the light of Regulation 707/2004.
3. Profile of a market participant: Pekao
Poland’s largest commercial banks, which compose a large
share of the WSE’s total market capitalization, are regular users of
derivatives.183 Pekao is one such bank. Established in 1929 and
currently the second largest bank traded on the WSE, Pekao is a
strong performer.184 In 2004, its return on equity was 18.4%, and it
consistently outperformed the WIG 20 by a significant margin.185
Pekao merits attention due to a number of factors, including its
prominence as a Polish market leader, its use of an equity driven
management, and its use of derivatives. As many U.S. firms have
begun to abandon options as a form of compensation,186 Pekao and
other Polish firms have just begun instituting stock option plans.187
In July 2003, Pekao approved “creation of a motivational program
for managers of the Bank’s capital group, who are key to realizing
the Bank’s strategy.”188 The Pekao program granted 14.1 million
long term stock options to managers in a two step transaction.189
Although option-based motivational schemes have some relevance
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See, e.g., PEKAO, 2004 RAPORT ROCZNY [ANNUAL REPORT] 109–10 (2005)
(reporting PLN 551 million in total derivatives contracts); Kominek, supra note 14, at
1028–29 (reporting that many of the largest members of the WSE are commercial
banks).
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Bank Pekao S.A., http://www.gpw.com.pl/zrodla/gpw/zlote/pekao.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2006).
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KAO.png.
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Louis Lavelle, Are Options Headed for Extinction?, BUS. WK., May 2, 2005,
at 12.
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See e.g., PKN ORLEN, supra note 176, at 146 (indicating that in 2003, Orlen
for the first time granted its officers 254,493 stock options, all of which were
exercised within the year); PEKAO, supra note 183, at 116–17.
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in assessing whether a firm poses a risk of accounting malfeasance,
such schemes are not necessary or sufficient conditions for such
malfeasance.
Whether or not a given firm has off-balance-sheet derivative
positions is a more relevant factor in assessing such risk. In 2004,
Pekao reported PLN 551 million of off-balance-sheet, OTC
derivatives contracts, a sum equal to seven percent of its total assets
of PLN 59 billion.190 In its financial statement notes, Pekao relates
that this sum is comprised of interest-rate swaps as well as currency
forwards and swaps.191 As an institution that prepares its statements
according to IFRS, IAS 39, and Regulation 707/2004, Pekao should
use these instruments in “hedging relationships where…the hedged
item is a net position; or where the hedge covers interest risk in a
held-to-maturity investment,” thus allowing the off-balance-sheet
treatment.192
Pekao’s stated intention in using all of its derivatives contracts
is to “manage the risks related to standard operations.”193 Despite
this legitimate purpose, derivatives contracts—measured at fair
value—in an amount equal to seven percent of a company’s total
assets are significant. The key question, therefore, is whether
managers will be tempted to strategically close out derivatives
contracts or mark them at other than fair value if it looks unlikely
that the bank will hit the most recent earnings estimates. In a
market with increasing scrutiny and competition where the means
for earnings manipulation are available, regulators must pay close
attention to the way that banks and other publicly traded entities
account for their derivatives contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
On balance, the FSAP successfully provided a workable plan
for introducing wide scale financial reform in the E.U. A key part
of this reform overhauled the E.U.’s statutory structure for the
regulation of derivatives in four key categories: risk management,
clearance and settlement, accounting standards, and market
manipulation. As the attention of European and member state
regulators shifts from legislative drafting to local implementation
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and enforcement, the derivatives provisions relating to accounting
standards and market manipulation are particularly important for
Poland and its neighboring states who recently joined the E.U.
Close-out netting poses a challenge for Polish legislators where
parties utilize a Credit Support Annex under the ISDA Master
Agreement. The regime allows bankruptcy administrators to
inequitably claim amounts due under the Annex in situations where,
in another jurisdiction, the amounts would belong to the nonbankrupt party according to the close-out netting calculation. Polish
legislators must update their regime to reflect the E.U. regime,
which preserves the right of creditors to set off all claims owing
against a debtor.
The Polish securities commission and futures exchange
regulators are attempting to prevent manipulation, and intervene
when it occurs. However, the failure of Polish prosecutors to bring
charges against manipulators has hindered efforts to establish a
“fair and orderly” futures market. Polish regulators should train
Polish prosecutors to prosecute the conduct specified in Directive
2003/6 and the most recent amendment to the Polish securities law
more effectively.
Regarding accounting standards, the carve-out that the
European Commission introduced into IAS 39 can potentially
undermine the requirement that companies reflect all of their assets
and liabilities at fair value. As a result, in Poland and other
European member states where publicly traded entities have the
ability and incentive to smooth earnings, regulators must pay close
attention to the way such entities account for their derivatives
contracts. Regulators will be able to circumvent the game of winks
and nods by carefully implementing E.U. anti-manipulation
standards and vigilantly watching the derivatives accounting habits
of banks and other publicly traded companies.
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